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Blindsight: A conscious route to unconscious vision
James Danckert and Melvyn A. Goodale
Damage to the primary visual cortex can leave subjects
with unconscious residual vision, or ‘blindsight’. New
research suggests that ‘top-down’ modulation by intact
conscious visual processes can improve performance in
the impaired visual domain, even though that domain
still remains quite inaccessible to consciousness.
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One way to study how the brain works is to look at the
behaviour of individuals who have been unlucky enough
to have suffered brain damage. This neuropsychological
approach to the study of brain function has a long history,
dating back to at least the early part of the last century.
Even today, at a time when neuroscience has become
increasingly dominated by molecular biology at one end of
the scale and neuroimaging at the other, the study of
behavioural deficits in neurological patients continues to
provide important insights into the functional organization
of the brain. This is particularly true of the study of vision,
where neuropsychological research has led to a complete
rethinking of how the visual pathways in the brain allow
us to see the world and control our movements within it.
The approach is well illustrated by a new study, published
recently in Current Biology [1], which has shown that
conscious visual experience of one type of visual input can
modulate the processing of different visual inputs that are
otherwise impaired in certain patients.
Patients with damage to primary visual cortex — area V1,
the first place in the cerebral cortex where visual informa-
tion arrives — are essentially blind. They can see nothing
in the region of the visual field opposite to the damaged
hemisphere (see Box 1). This kind of blindness, as it is not
due to any defect of the eye or the optic nerve, is often
referred to as ‘cortical blindness’. Some 25 years ago,
however, it was discovered that some individuals who
were cortically blind in a part of their visual field could
nevertheless demonstrate ‘unconscious’ visual processing
of stimuli appearing in that field [2]. For example, an indi-
vidual might point quite accurately towards a visual target
in their blind field, despite confidently asserting that they
had seen nothing [3]! Indeed, such individuals would
sometimes deny that a target had been presented at all
and could only be persuaded that they had pointed
accurately by confronting them later with the evidence of
their performance. Lawrence Weiskrantz [4] coined the
term ‘blindsight’ to refer to this paradoxical phenomenon
in which patients respond to visual stimuli that they
cannot see. It is important to note that patients with
damage earlier in the visual pathway, at the level of the
eye or the optic nerve, do not show any evidence of blind-
sight [5,6] (see Box 1).
The phenomenon of blindsight suggests that other visual
pathways — ones that are not entirely reliant on input
from primary visual cortex — must continue to function in
its absence [2]. After all, without spared visual pathways,
how else could patients demonstrate blindsight? One of
the most prominent pathways spared after lesions of
primary visual cortex is the one running from the eye
directly to the superior colliculus in the midbrain. Many
have suggested that it is this pathway, and its indirect pro-
jections to the cerebral cortex, that mediate much of what
has been called blindsight. But this idea is not universally
accepted. More sceptical investigators have suggested that
blindsight, such as it is, is carried out by spared ‘islands’ of
cortex within the lesion itself. According to this view,
blindsight is nothing more than a reduction, albeit a dra-
matic one, in the sensitivity of normal vision [7].
But while this possibility is no doubt true in some cases,
the weight of evidence suggests that the residual vision in
a substantial number of patients does depend on path-
ways outside the major projections to primary visual
cortex. In fact, it would be surprising if this were not the
case. Although projections from the retina to primary
visual cortex and beyond represent the major neural
circuit supporting conscious vision, as we have just seen,
this route is not the only way that visual information
reaches the brain. In addition to the projections to the
superior colliculus, the retina projects directly to at least
ten other distinct sites in the thalamus, hypothalamus and
midbrain — and some of these structures send projec-
tions in turn to the cerebral cortex. Processing in all or
some of these pathways could support many of the differ-
ent kinds of visually guided behaviour that have been
called blindsight. What is irrevocably lost in patients with
damage to primary visual cortex is not the ability to
respond to visual events, but rather the ability to experi-
ence those events consciously [4].
Patients with damage to primary visual cortex are not the
only ones to demonstrate residual visual capacities
without visual awareness [8–11]. Patients with more spe-
cific visual deficits following damage to the neural outflow
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from this region can also show behaviour that is reminis-
cent of blindsight. Thus, these patients sometimes
demonstrate remarkable visual abilities within their
impaired perceptual domain, even though, like the blind-
sight patients, they have no conscious appreciation of the
visual cues to which they are responding with such
impressive accuracy. The specific deficits in visual per-
ception can present themselves in a number of different
ways (see Box 1). Patients with visual form agnosia, for
example, lose the ability to discriminate between objects
with different shapes, even though they can perceive
colour and motion. Conversely, patients with cortical
colour blindness (achromatopsia) are quite unable to iden-
tify the colours of objects but retain the ability to see
motion and form [12] (see Box 1). Yet both these kinds of
patients can demonstrate spared visual processing within
the very domain that is compromised. Patients with visual
form agnosia can pre-shape their fingers and orient their
hand appropriately when picking up objects of different
shapes, even though they cannot tell one shape from
another [11]. Similarly, patients with achromatopsia can
differentiate contours that are defined solely by differ-
ences in colour, despite having no conscious appreciation
of the colours themselves [12] (see Box 1).
In patients with specific perceptual deficits, there is an
opportunity to use what the patient can see consciously to
explore what they process unconsciously. This opportu-
nity, by definition, is not available for the blindsight
patient, at least not within the blind visual field.
Humphrey et al. [9] used the intact colour perception in
patients with disturbed form perception to reveal the
unconscious processing of form in those patients. To do
this, they took advantage of the fact that some colour
aftereffects are dependent on the orientation of the
stimuli that are used to adapt the visual system. For
example, after looking at a pattern of horizontal green and
black lines alternating with a pattern of vertical red and
black lines, people will later see an ‘aftereffect’ of com-
plementary colours when shown a display of black and
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The primary visual pathway and effects of lesions.
(a) The primary pathway for vision from the retina to the primary visual
cortex via the lateral geniculate nucleus of the thalamus and the optic
radiations — the so-called geniculostriate pathway. The numbers
provide a key to the nature of the visual field defect (or portion of
blindness) that would result from a lesion at that particular point in the
pathway. 1 Total blindness of the left eye resulting from a complete
lesion of the optic nerve; 2 bitemporal hemianopia resulting from a
lesion of the optic chiasm; 3 right homonymous hemianopia resulting
from a lesion of the primary visual cortex in the left hemisphere (note
that there is no macular sparing which is common in patients in whom
the lesion has spared the occipital pole). (b) Conscious and
unconscious visual processes in patients with lesions of cortical visual
areas. The lesions typically responsible for visual form agnosia occur in
the occipitotemporal cortex, often sparing primary visual cortex and the
optic radiations. Similarly, lesions causing achromatopsia are typically
confined to ventromedial occipital cortex, and in addition to sparing
primary visual cortex may spare the regions necessary for form and
motion processing. The top panel in the figure represents an arbitrary
visual stimulus. Panel 1 represents a right visual field defect for a
patient with blindsight arising from a left primary visual cortex lesion.
Also schematically represented is the patient’s unconscious
experience, in which he or she can localize stimuli appearing in the
blind field. Panel 2 schematically represents both conscious and
unconscious processing for a patient with visual form agnosia. This
patient’s conscious experience is not sufficient to accurately
discriminate between even simple shapes. However, shape information
is available to the patient at an unconscious level, allowing him or her
to accurately grasp the different shapes they cannot consciously
identify (note that colour is also available to this patient — see text for a
discussion of this issue). Finally, panel 3 indicates the conscious and
unconscious experience of a patient with achromatopsia. While this
patient is unable to accurately discriminate between the colour of
different objects consciously, he or she can nevertheless use colour
information at an unconscious level to discriminate contours and forms
of objects, as well as their direction of motion. 
Box 1
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white lines. What is interesting, is that the aftereffect is
orientation-contingent: in the example just given, the
horizontal lines would look pinkish and the vertical lines
would look greenish.
Even though the patients studied by Humphrey et al. [9]
could not discriminate between the different orientations
of the stimuli used in the experiment, they nevertheless
showed an orientation-contingent colour aftereffect. In
other words, the patients experienced colour aftereffects
that depended on orientations that they could not
consciously perceive [9,13]. This approach to studying
vision in patients with damage to the visual pathways
could be considered a kind of ‘bootstrapping’ operation, in
which a conscious visual ability is manipulated in order to
reveal the processing of visual input of which the patient
remains quite unaware. 
There is another way to use this ‘bootstrapping’ approach.
Instead of inferring unconscious visual processing by
looking at its effect on a patient’s report of his conscious
visual experience, one can turn the whole thing around
and attempt to use the patient’s intact conscious visual
abilities to enhance his performance in the compromised
visual domain. This is precisely the approach taken by
Aglioti et al. [1]. Their patient, SF, had a severe visual
form agnosia and could not identify even simple visual
forms, including letters of the alphabet. As with many
other cases of visual form agnosia, however, SF had no
difficulty naming colours or discriminating between diff-
erent shades of colour. Aglioti et al. [1] investigated
whether or not SF’s spared colour perception could be
used to improve his ability to discriminate form. The task
they used was a variant of the Stroop test, in which normal
individuals take longer to read a colour word like ‘red’
when it is printed in green ink (an incongruent trial) than
when it is printed in red (a congruent trial). This so-called
Stroop effect will work even in the case where only the
initial letter of a colour name is used.
Aglioti et al. [1] asked patient SF to identify the letters ‘R’
and ‘V’, the initial letters of the Italian colour words ‘rosso’
(red) and ‘verde’ (green). Earlier testing had shown that
SF could not discriminate between single letters, includ-
ing V and R. Yet when given the Stroop test, he was more
accurate and faster at reading V and R when those letters
were printed in the congruent colours (the letter ‘R’ in
red, and the letter ‘V’ in green) than when they were
printed in the incongruent colours (the letter ‘R’ printed
in green and the letter ‘V’ in red). This was true despite
the fact that SF claimed to be completely unaware of the
forms of the two letters — like blindsight patients he felt
he was simply guessing at the forms presented to him.
Although he later claimed to have a ‘feeling’ that he was
performing above chance level, he maintained that he had
no conscious visual experience of the form of the letters. 
What is going on here? Aglioti et al. [1] argue that SF’s
normal colour perception, which allowed him to accurately
identify the colour of the letters, automatically activated
his stored memories of the colour names, ‘rosso’ and
‘verde’, which in turn produced some sort of internal image
of those colour words. It was the activation of these internal
images that Aglioti et al. [1] believe boosted the weak
signals coming from the damaged form pathway in SF —
signals that were quite inaccessible to consciousness.
It is important to note that SF was not simply showing
some mutual interference between his conscious colour
perception and his residual, but unconscious, form
processing. Aglioti et al. [1] are making a stronger claim
than this. They are suggesting that, without the addition
of the congruent or incongruent colour cues, there
would be no processing of form at all. Indeed, they
showed in other tests, that the form of the letters never
affected SF’s naming of colours, as it does in individuals
with normal vision. In SF’s case, it was strictly one-way
bootstrapping: the conscious visual processing of colour
invoked the unconscious processing of form, but not
vice versa.
We began this commentary by pointing out that much of
what is called blindsight or unconscious visual processing
in patients with brain damage is nothing more than the
‘normal’ functioning of spared secondary visual pathways.
The initiation of eye movements [14], the constriction of
the pupil [15], and even the control of grasping move-
ments directed at visual targets [11], all appear to depend
on visual pathways that are quite outside those mediating
our conscious visual perception of the world. It is no
surprise, therefore, to find that patients with profound
deficits in visual perception can sometimes show remark-
ably intact, but quite unconscious, visual abilities (see
Box 1). What Aglioti et al. [1] have added to this picture is
the demonstration that it is possible for intact conscious
visual processing to influence how information is
processed in the impaired domain.
Several challenges arise from their results. First of all, how
is the intact ability able to influence processing in the
impaired domain? Is it the case, as Aglioti et al. [1] suggest,
that unconscious residual form processing is enhanced by
top-down cognitive processes that are invoked by colour
perception and/or visual imagery? In other words, is it
possible for impaired functions to ‘hitch a ride’ on intact
functions? Alternatively, do intact visual processes simply
improve access to the weak signals in the impaired
pathway, rather than enhancing the signal within that
impaired domain? The answers to these questions will
have important implications for our models of normal
visual function, as well as providing insights into which
visual processes are necessary for conscious vision and
which are not. 
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If you found this dispatch interesting, you might also want
to read the August 1999 issue of
Current Opinion in
Neurobiology
which included the following reviews, edited
by Ben A Barres and Louis F Reichardt, on
Neuronal and glial cell biology:
Lineages and transcription factors in the specification
of vertebrate primary sensory neurons
David J Anderson
Sense and specificity: a molecular identity for
nociceptors
Michael J Caterina and David Julius
Glia development in the embryonic CNS of Drosophila
Sebastian Granderath and Christian Klämbt
Fringe: defining borders by regulating the Notch pathway
Jane Y Wu and Yi Rao
Extracellular-signal-regulated kinase signalling in
neurons
Savraj S Grewal, Randall D York and Philip JS Stork
Neurofilament functions in health and disease
Jean-Pierre Julien
Postsynaptic actin and neuronal plasticity
Andrew Matus
Polyglutamine diseases: protein cleavage and
aggregation
Huda Y Zoghbi and Harry T Orr
the same issue also included the following
reviews, edited by Harvey Karten and
Andrew Lumsden, on Evolution of the
nervous system:
Conservation of neurogenic genes and mechanisms
Yee-Ming Chan, Yuh Nung Jan
Conserved usage of gap and homeotic genes in
patterning the CNS
Heinrich Reichert and Antonio Simeone
Chordate origins of the vertebrate central nervous system
Linda Z Holland, Nicholas D Holland
Conservation and divergence of axon guidance
mechanisms
Andrew Chisholm, Marc Tessier-Lavigne
Evolution of the vertebrate neurotrophin and Trk
receptor gene families
Finn Hallböök
The full text of Current Opinion in Neurobiology is in the
BioMedNet library at
http://BioMedNet.com/cbiology/jnrb
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